Determinantes de la concentración de la propiedad empresarial en México

  1. Watkins Fassler, Karen
  2. Flores Vargas, Diana Rubí
Revista:
Contaduría y administración

ISSN: 0186-1042,  2448-8410

Año de publicación: 2016

Volumen: 61

Número: 2

Páginas: 224-242

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.CYA.2015.05.015 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Otras publicaciones en: Contaduría y administración

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Resumen

Las empresas no financieras listadas en la Bolsa Mexicana de Valores durante el periodo 2001-2012 presentan una alta concentración de la propiedad. Esta no cambia significativamente en el tiempo, excepto considerando períodos normales y de crisis financiera. Mediante un análisis de datos panel se comprueba que dentro de las variables más importantes para explicar la concentración accionaria se encuentran el rendimiento sobre los activos y el porcentaje de directores independientes dentro de las Juntas Directivas. No obstante, la estructura de la propiedad está condicionada también por factores de índole psicológico y cultural, y predomina la influencia del grado de protección a los inversionistas.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet