Determinantes de la concentración de la propiedad empresarial en México

  1. Watkins Fassler, Karen
  2. Flores Vargas, Diana Rubí
Journal:
Contaduría y administración

ISSN: 0186-1042,  2448-8410

Year of publication: 2016

Volume: 61

Issue: 2

Pages: 224-242

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1016/J.CYA.2015.05.015 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

More publications in: Contaduría y administración

Sustainable development goals

Abstract

High ownership concentration is common for non-financial companies, listed in the Mexican Stock Market during the period 2001-2012. This characteristic does not change considerably in time, except taking into account normal versus financial crisis periods. Through panel data analysis it is possible to determine that two of the most important variables in order to explain ownership concentration are return on assets and the percentage of independent Board members. Nevertheless, ownership structure is also conditioned by psychological and cultural factors, and the degree of investor protection has an important influence on proprietorship.

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Data source: Dialnet