La integración vertical, imperfecciones en el mercado intermedio, cualidades de la empresa y cambios en la industria

  1. Díez Vial, Isabel
Revista:
Esic market

ISSN: 0212-1867

Año de publicación: 2005

Número: 122

Páginas: 149-178

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Esic market

Resumen

En este trabajo se analizan las principales razones para la integración vertical desde cuatro perspectivas: la economía industrial, la nueva economía institucional, la perspectiva basada en los recursos y los modelos dinámicos de integración vertical. Para cada una de ellas, se identifican las hipótesis desarrolladas, las medidas utilizadas y las características de la evidencia empírica existente. A partir de esta revisión, se concluye que las decisiones de integración vertical implican la consideración simultánea de las características de la industria y las diferencias de poder de mercado entre las fases implicadas; los atributos de la transacción entre las etapas y las consecuencias para la eficiencia de la integración vertical; los recursos que la empresa posee y su aplicabilidad a lo largo de la cadena de valor; y, finalmente, la aparición de innovaciones en la industria que alteran la forma de organizar el proceso productivo.

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