La influencia de los procesos controlados en el razonamiento con Teoría de la Mente (ToM) en niños con y sin discapacidad intelectual

1. Araya, Katherine
2. Araya, Carla
3. Chaigneau Orfanoz, S. E.
4. Martínez Guerrero, Luis
5. Castillo, Ramón D.

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More publications in: Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología

Abstract

The ability to attribute mental states to others and oneself, to anticipate, understand and predict behavior is known as Theory of Mind (ToM). Part of the current discussion focuses on understanding whether this reasoning is a separate process or subordinate to the executive process of conscious control. We analyze the effect of executive functions of conscious control on reasoning tasks with ToM, in children with and without intellectual disabilities. The sample included 30 children with intellectual disabilities and 20 children without intellectual disabilities. We hypothesize that the ability to answer the questions of control, an operational definition of the executive functions of conscious control, is most often associated with the tasks of second order to first order, because the second order task requiring increased representational capability. The results suggest that the processes of conscious control are not only associated with tasks requiring a higher representational, but to all the tasks that require reasoning with mental states, be they first or second order.

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