Independencia de los Consejos de Administración, concentración de la propiedad y rentabilidad de las empresas listadas en México y Chile

  1. Karen Watkins-Fassler 1
  2. Guadalupe del Carmen Briano-Turrent 2
  3. Diana Laura Franco-Ramírez 3
  4. José Luis Román-Sánchez 3
  1. 1 Universidad Internacional de La Rioja, España
  2. 2 Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, México
  3. 3 Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla, México
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Revue:
Revista Finanzas y Política Económica

ISSN: 2248-6046

Année de publication: 2022

Volumen: 14

Número: 1

Pages: 245-269

Type: Article

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D'autres publications dans: Revista Finanzas y Política Económica

Résumé

This paper examines the effect of Board independen-ce on the profitability of non-financial companies listed in Mexico and Chile from 2009 to 2016. It examines the impact on financial performance of the percentage of independent Board members and their tenure, which is evaluated consi-dering ownership concentration. Based on dynamic panel models, the study concludes that the degree of independence does not favor business results, regardless of the concentration of ownership. However, the tenure of independent directors does have a negative impact on the performance of these firms. The results obtained question the legal requirements related to corporate governance for the companies listed in Latin America and suggest empirical lines of research that encourage identifying effective checks and balances for these companies.

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