Financial performance in Mexican family vs. non-family firms

  1. Karen Watkins Fassler 1
  1. 1 Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla, México
Revista:
Contaduría y administración

ISSN: 0186-1042,  2448-8410

Año de publicación: 2018

Volumen: 63

Número: 2

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.22201/FCA.24488410E.2018.1214 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Contaduría y administración

Resumen

Este artículo analiza los efectos de la propiedad familiar en el desempeño empresarial mexicano. Para este fin se utilizan datos anuales de 89 firmas no financieras, que cotizaron en la Bolsa Mexicana de Valores durante el período 2001-2015 (el cual incluye el episodio de crisis 2008-2009). La relación entre propiedad familiar y desempeño empresarial se estudia empíricamente a través de estimaciones GMM. Los resultados muestran que las empresas familiares son más rentables que las no familiares. Asimismo, se aprecia un mejor desempeño en aquellas empresas familiares dirigidas por miembros de las mismas familias, en comparación con aquellas lideradas por CEOs externos. El tamaño de las firmas, la independencia del Consejo de Administración y la edad de la empresa tienen un efecto negativo en el rendimiento sobre los activos; en cambio, la concentración de la propiedad se asocia positivamente con el desempeño financiero. No hay unanimidad en la literatura con respecto a las ventajas de las empresas familiares, particularmente diferenciando entre períodos normales y de crisis financieras. Aunque hay una serie de artículos relacionados para mercados desarrollados, los estudios que involucran economías latinoamericanas son escasos. Este artículo aporta a la literatura para el contexto de América Latina, con el caso mexicano.

Referencias bibliográficas

  • Anderson, R.C., Duru, A., and Reeb, D.M. (2012). Investment policy in family controlled firms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36 (6), 1744-1758. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.01.018
  • Andres, C (2011). Family ownership, financing constraints and investment decisions. Applied Financial Economics, 21 (22), 1641-1659. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1101453
  • Arregle, J., Hitt, M., Sirmon, D., and Very, P. (2007). The development of organizational social capital: Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1), 73-95.
  • Baek, J.S., Kang, J.K., and Park, K.S. (2004). Corporate Governance and firm value: Evidence from the Korean financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 71 (2), 265–313. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00167-3
  • Bank of Mexico (2009). Annual Report Summary: http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/informes-periodicos/anual/%7B7447993F-55EF-F7FD-7E30-01015753E686%7D.pdf
  • Barca F., Ferri G., Pesaresi N. (1998) Banks and Corporate Governance in Italy: A Two-Tier Model. In: Balling M., Hennessy E., O’Brien R. (eds) Corporate Governance, Financial Markets and Global Convergence. Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, vol 33. Springer, Boston, MA https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2633-6_2
  • Barontini, R. and Caprio, L. (2006). The effect of family control on firm value and performance: Evidence from Continental Europe. European Financial Management, 12 (5), 689-723. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468- 036x.2006.00273.x
  • Bena, J. and Li, K. (2014). Corporate innovations and mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 69 (5), 1923-1960. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12059
  • Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K.M., Perez-Gonzalez, F., and Wolfenzon, D. (2007). Inside the family firm: The role of families in succession decisions and performance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (2), 647-691. https:// doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.2.647
  • Bennedsen, M. and Wolfenzon, D. (2000). The balance of power in closely held corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58 (1, 2), 113-139. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00068-4
  • Berle, A. and Means, G. (1991). The modern corporation and private property. New York: Routledge. https://doi. org/10.4324/9781315133188
  • Bertrand, M. and Schoar, A. (2006). The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2), 73-96.
  • Borhanuddin, R.I. and Ching, P.W. (2011). Cash holding, leverage, ownership concentration and Board independence: Evidence from Malaysia. Malaysian Accounting Review, 10 (1), 63-88.
  • Boubakri, N., Cosset, J.C., and Guedhami, O. (2005). Postprivatization Corporate Governance: The role of ownership structure and investor protection. Journal of Financial Economics, 76 (2), 369-399. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. jfineco.2004.05.003
  • Brigham, K.H., Lumpkin, G.T., Payne, G.T., and Zachary, M.A. (2013). Researching long-term orientation: A validation study and recommendations for future research. Family Business Review, DOI: 10.1177/0894486513508980
  • Bunkanwanicha, P., Gupta, J., and Rokhim, R. (2008). Debt and entrenchment: Evidence from Thailand and Indonesia. European Journal of Operational Research, 185 (3), 1578-1595. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.08.025
  • Castañeda,G. (2005).Consequences of firms’ relational financing in the aftermath of the 1995 Mexican banking crisis. Journal of Applied Economics, 8(1), 53-79.
  • Chong, A., Gullén, J. and López-de-Silanes, F. (2009). Corporate Governance reform and firm value in Mexico: An empirical assessment. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 12 (3), 163-188. https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870903105346
  • Conyon, M. and Florou. A. (2002). Top executive dismissal, ownership and corporate performance. Accounting and Business Research, 32 (4), 209-225. https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2002.9728971
  • Demsetz, H. and Villalonga, B. (2001). Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7 (3), 209-233. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(01)00020-7
  • Donaldson, L. and Davis, J.H. (1991). Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16 (1), 49-65. https://doi.org/10.1177/031289629101600103
  • Dou, J., Zhang, Z., and Su, E. (2014). Does family involvement make firms donate more? Empirical evidence from Chinese private firms. Family Business Review, 27 (3), 259-274. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486514538449
  • Estrin, S. and Prevezer, M. (2011). The role of informal institutions in corporate governance: Brazil, Russia, India, and China compared. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(1), 41-67.
  • Fee, C.E. and Hadlock, C.J. (2004). Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37 (1), 3-38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.11.003
  • Fernando, G.D., Schneible, R.A., and Suh, S.H. (2014). Family firms and institutional investors. Family Business Review, 27(4), 328–345.
  • Franks, J., Mayer, C., Pin, P., and Wagner, H.F. (2008). Elution of family capitalism: A comparative study of France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. Working Paper, London Business School, University of Oxford, and Bocconi University.
  • Franks, J., Mayer, C., pin, P., and Wagner, H.F. (2012). The life cycle of family ownership: International evidence. The Review of Financial Studies, 25 (6), 1675-1712. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr135
  • Galve, C. (2002). Propiedad y gobierno: La empresa familiar. Ekonomiaz, 50 (2), 158-181.
  • Gómez-Mejía, L.R., Haynes, K., Núñez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K.J.L., and Moyano-Fuentes, J. (2007). Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52 (1), 106–137. https://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.52.1.106
  • Hauswald, H., Hack, A., Kellermanns, F.W., and Patzelt, H. (2015). Attracting new talent to family firms: Who is attracted and under what conditions? Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 40 (5), 963- 989 doi: 10.1111/etap.12153.
  • Henssen, B., Voordeckers, W., Lambrechts, F., and Koiranen, M. (2014). The CEO autonomy–stewardship behavior relationship in family firms: The mediating role of psychological ownership. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 5, 312–322. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2014.01.012
  • Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
  • Jensen, M.C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76 (2), 323-329.
  • Jiang, Y. and Peng, M. (2011). Principal-principal conflicts during crisis. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(4), 683-696.
  • Kim, E. (2006). The impact of family ownership and capital structures on productivity performance of Korean manufacturing firms: Corporate Governance and the “Chaebol problem”. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 20 (2), 209-233. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jjie.2005.02.001
  • Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. (2000). Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. The Journal of Finance, 55 (2), 867-891.
  • Kleibergen, F. and Mavroeidis, S. (2009). Weak instrument robust ttests in GMM and the new Keynesian Phillips Curve. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 27(3), 293-339.
  • La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9
  • La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58 (1), 3-27.
  • Le Breton-Miller, I. and Miller, D. (2016). Family firms and practices of sustainability: A contingency view. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 7(1), 26-33.
  • Martínez, J.I., Stöhr, B.S., and Quiroga, B.F. (2007). Family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from public companies in Chile. Family Business Review, 20 (2), 83-94. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.2007.00087.x
  • Maury, B. (2006). Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12 (2), 321-341.
  • Miralles-Marcelo, J.L., Miralles-Quirós, M.M., and Lisboa, I. (2014). The impact of family control on firm performance: Evidence from Portugal and Spain. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 5, 156–168.
  • Mitton, T. (2002). A cross-firm analysis of the impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 64 (2), 215-241. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00076-4
  • Müller, C. (2014). Knowledge transfer and family influence: Effects on innovation and performance. Working Paper, School of Economics and Business, University of Chile.
  • Peng, M. and Jiang, Y. (2010). Institutions behind family ownership and control in large firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47(2), 253-273. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00890.x
  • Pindado, J., Requejo, I., and de la Torre, C. (2011). Family control and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the euro zone. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17 (5), 1389-1409. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.07.003
  • San Martín-Reyna, J.M., and Durán-Encalada, J.A. (2012). The relationship among family business, corporate governance, and firm performance: Evidence from the Mexican stock exchange. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 3, 106-117. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.03.001
  • Santiago, M. and Brown, C.J. (2011). Corporate governance, expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights, and performance of Latin American enterprises. Annals of Finance, 7 (4), 429-447. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-009- 0132-z
  • Setia-Atmaja, L.Y. (2009). Governance mechanisms and firm value: The impact of ownership concentration and dividends. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17 (6), 694-709. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467- 8683.2009.00768.x
  • Sharma, P., Chrisman, J. J., and Chua, J. H. (1997). Strategic management of the family business: Past research and future challenges. Family Business Review, 10, 1–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.1997.00001.x
  • Sharma, P., Salvato, C., and Reay, T. (2014). Temporal dimensions of family enterprise research. Family Business Review, 27(1), 10-19.
  • Sitthipongpanich, T. and Polsiri, P. (2015). Do CEO and board characteristics matter? A study of Thai family firms. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 6(2), 119-129. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2015.01.002
  • Sraer, D. and Thesmar, D. (2007). Performance and behavior of family firms: Evidence from the French stock market. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5, 709-751. https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.4.709
  • Stanley, L.J., and McDowell, W. (2014). The role of interorganizational trust and organizational efficacy in family and nonfamily firms. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 5(3),264-275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2013.07.001
  • Steier, L. (2009). Familiar capitalism in global institutional contexts: Implications for corporate governance and entrepreneurship in East Asia. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(3), 513–535. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490- 008-9117-0
  • Tosi, H.L., S. Werner, J.P. Katz, and Gómez-Mejía, L. (2000). How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies. The Journal of Management, 26 (2), 301-339. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0149-2063(99)00047-1
  • Valenti, A., and Horner, S.V. (2010). Corporate directors´ social capital: How centrality and density impact board monitoring. Journal of Applied Business and Economics,11(4),117-127.
  • Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80 (2), 385–417. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005
  • Ward, J.L. (2016). Keeping the family business healthy: How to plan for continuing growth, profitability, and family leadership. Palgrave Macmillan, UK.
  • Watkins, K., Briano, G., and Rodríguez, L. (2016). Efectos de la capacidad y procedencia de los CEOs en el desempeño financiero de las empresas cotizadas familiares: Evidencias para México. José Ángel Vázquez (ed.). In: Lecciones para empresarios familiares, Volume VII, UDEM.
  • Watkins, K., Fernández, V., and Rodríguez, L. (2017). President interlocking, family firms and performance during turbulent times: Evidence from Latin America. European Journal of Family Business, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j. ejfb.2016.12.001
  • Zellweger, T. (2007). Time horizon, cost of equity capital, and generic investment strategies of firms. Family Business Review, 20(1), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.2007.00080.x
  • Zhang, J. (2013). Foreign Direct Investment, Governance, and the Environment in China. Palgrave Macmillan, UK.
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet