Reemplazos de directivos en Méxicode la teoría a la práctica

  1. Karen Watkins Fassler
  2. Martín Dávila Delgado
Revista:
Contaduría y administración

ISSN: 0186-1042,  2448-8410

Año de publicación: 2012

Volumen: 57

Número: 1

Páginas: 13-28

Tipo: Artículo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Contaduría y administración

Resumen

En este trabajo se reflexiona sobre la teoría de los reemplazos y su aplicación al caso de México. Se buscan las correspondencias, así como las diferencias, entre la literatura para países desarrollados y la realidad mexicana (economía emergente). Se describe no sólo la ocurrencia de los reemplazos en México, sino también sus repercusiones sobre el desempeño empresarial. Se concluye que en México hay muy pocos reemplazos, particularmente por la estructura familiar de las firmas mexicanas; asimismo, éstos no favorecen al desempeño empresarial, al menos en el corto y mediano plazo.

Referencias bibliográficas

  • Barro, J, Barro, R. (1990). Pay, performance and turnover of Bank CEOs. Journal of Labor Economics. 8. 448-481
  • Bonnier, K. A., Bruner, R.F.. (1989). An analysis of stock price reaction to management change in distressed firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 11. 95-106
  • Brickley, J.A., Coles, J, Terry, R.L.. (1994). Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. Journal of Financial Economics. 35. 371-390
  • Brunello, Giorgio, Graziano, Clara, Parigi, Bruno. (2003). CEO Turnover in insider dominated boards: the italian case. Journal of Banking and Finance. 27. 1027-1051
  • Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon, Fan, Joseph P.H., Lang Larry, H.P.. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance. 57. 2741-2772
  • Coffee, J. (1999). The future as history: the prospects for global convergence in corporate governance and its implications. Northwestern University Law Review. 93. 641-708
  • Conyon, Martin J, Florou, Annita. (2002). Top executive dismissal, ownership and corporate performance. Accounting and Business Research. 32. 209-226
  • Coughlan, Anne T, Schmidt, Ronald M.. Executive compensation, management turnover and firm performance: an empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 7. 43-66
  • Cosh, A, Hughes, A. (1997). Executive remuneration, executive dismissal and institutional shareholdings. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 15. 469-492
  • Dávila, Watkins. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance lessons from de Mexican crisis (1994-1995). World Council for Corporate Governance.
  • DeFond, Mark L, Park, C.W.. (1999). The effect of competition en CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 27. 35-56
  • Dehaene, Alexander, Vuyst, Veerle De, Hubert, Ooghe. (2001). Corporate performance and board structure in Belgian companies. Long Range Planning. 34. 383-398
  • Denis, D.J., Denis, Diane K.. (1995). Performance changes following top management dismissals. Journal of Finance. 50. 1029-1057
  • Dyck, Alexander, Zingales, Luigi. (2004). Private benefits of control: an international comparison. Journal of Finance. 59. 537-600
  • Fama, Eugene F.. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy. 88. 288-307
  • Fama, Eugene F., Jensen Michael, C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics. 26. 301-325
  • Fee, C., Edward, Hadlock, Charles J.. (2000). Management turnover and product market competition: empirical evidence from the U.S. newspaper industry. Journal of Business. 73. 205-243
  • Fee, C., Edward. (2004). Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 37. 3-38
  • Fung, Peter M.Y., Rui, Oliver M.. (2006). Firm performance, governance structure, and top management turnover in a transitional economy. Journal of Management Studies. 43. 1289-1330
  • Furtado, E.P.H., Karan, V. (1990). Causes, consequences and shareholder wealth effects of management turnover: a review of the empirical evidence. Financial Management. 19. 60-75
  • Gibbons, R, Murphy, K.J.. (1990). Relative performance evaluation for Chief Executive Officers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 43. 305-515
  • Gibson, Michael S. (2003). Is corporate governance ineffective in emerging markets?. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 38. 231-250
  • Harrison, J.R., Torres, D.L., Kukalis, S. (1988). The changing of the guard: turnover and structural change in the top-management positions. Administrative Science Quarterly. 33. 211-232
  • Hermalin, Benjamin, E, Weisbach Michael, S. (1998). Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. The American Economic Review. 88. 96-118
  • Hossain, Mahmud, Prevost, Andrew K., Rao, Ramesh P.. (2001). Corporate governance in New Zealand: the effect of the 1993 companies act on the relation between board composition and firm performance. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 9. 119-145
  • Hotchkiss, Edith S. (1995). Postbankruptcy performance and management turnover. Journal of Finance. 50. 3-21
  • Huson, Mark R., Malatesta, Paul H., Parrino, Robert. (2004). Managerial succession and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics. 74. 237-275
  • Husted, Bryan W, Serrano, Carlos. (2001). Corporate governance in Mexico. Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey. 1-28
  • Jensen, Michael C, Murphy, K.J.. (1990). Performance pay and top management incentives. Journal of Political Economy. 98. 225-264
  • Jenter, Dirk C, Kanaan, Fadi. (2006). CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation. MIT Sloan Research Paper. 4594-06
  • Jovanovic, Boyan. (1979). Job matching and the theory of turnover. Journal of Political Economy. 87. 972-990
  • Khanna, Naveen, Poulsen, Annette B.. (1995). Managers of financially distressed firms: villains or scapegoats?. Journal of Finance. 50. 919-940
  • Kaplan, Steven N. (1994). Top executives, turnover, and firm performance in Germany. Journal of Law Economics and Organization. 10. 142-159
  • Kim, Y. (1996). Long-term firm performance and chief executive turnover: an empirical study of the dynamics. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 12. 480-496
  • La Porta, Rafael, López-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy. 106. 1115-1155
  • Lausten, Mette. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 20. 391-414
  • Lefort, Fernando, Walker, Eduardo. (2000). Corporate governance: challenges for Latin America. Revista ABANTE. 2. 99-111
  • Lefort, Fernando, González, Rodrigo. (2010). Hacia un mejor gobierno corporativo en Chile. Revista ABANTE. 11.
  • Manne, Henry G. (1965). Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political Economy. 73. 110-120
  • McKenna, C. J.. (1986). Equilibrium wage offers and turnover in a simple search market. The Economic Journal. 96. 785-797
  • Morris, Michael. (1997). Correlates of success in family business transitions. Journal of Business Venturing. 12. 385-401
  • Murphy, Kevin J. (1986). Incentives, learning and compensation: a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts. Rand Journal of Economics. 17. 59-76
  • Nair, Vinay B. (2005). Corporate governance and internal organization. Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania.
  • Parrino, Robert. (1997). CEO turnover and outside succession: a cross-sectional analysis. Journal of Financial Economics. 46. 165-197
  • Puffer, S.M., Weintrop, J.B.. (1991). Corporate performance and CEO turnover: the role of performance expectations. Administrative Science Quarterly. 36. 1-19
  • Santiago, Marisela, Brown, Cynthia. (2009). An empirical analysis of Latin American board of directors and minority shareholders' rights. Forum Empresarial. 14. 1-18
  • Warner, Jerold B, Watts, Ross L, Wruck, Karen H. (1988). Stock prices and top management changes. Journal of Financial Economics. 20. 461-492
  • Weisbach, Michael S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO Turnover. Journal of Financial Economics. 20. 431-460
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet