Explorando la relación entre políticas crediticias y resultados de la banca española ex-post.

  1. Ibáñez Hernández, Francisco Jaime
  2. Peña Cerezo, Miguel Ángel
  3. Araujo de la Mata, Andrés
Revista:
Universidad & Empresa

ISSN: 0124-4639,  0124-4639

Any de publicació: 2008

Volum: 10

Número: 14

Pàgines: 11-33

Tipus: Article

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAccés obert editor

Altres publicacions en: Universidad & Empresa

Resum

This paper analyzes the relationship between bank credit policies and their ex-post performance. Literature review reveals that, sometimes, credit markets can be affected by a stronger endogenous component that usually assumed. We propose that the growth speed of the bank credit portfolio in expansive cycles is related to its ex-post performance once the recession cycle begins. The analysis outcomes refl ect a strong relation between the speed in the expansion of the credit and a poorer behaviour of the benefi ts, returns and insolvencies.

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